Planter Fascist-itis: the Undead Evil of Confederates and Their Ilk

I've been listening to the Radio War Nerd podcast for several years and have particularly enjoyed their series on the U.S. Civil War. Co-host Gary Brecher (aka John Dolan, the War Nerd) published a collection of essays on the Civil War called They Should Have Been Hanged. I found the collection thrilling and infuriating, full of observations on American personalities and political culture that have rung true for 200+ years. It would serve as good pre-reading for Black Reconstruction by W.E.B. Du Bois. From the defeat of the Confederacy, to the thwarting of Reconstruction, to the rehabilitation of the planters, to the Lost Cause, to the elision of treason among Union and Confederate officers, to the "both sides"-ing of every war America has fought, to the criminal War on Terror, America has a way of rescuing its evils from the progress of defeat, perpetuating injustice by refusing to carry out the guilty verdicts demanded by the victims and victors of war. Those we failed to literally hang are still with us today, figuratively reincarnated as new persons with different names. Our failure to hang them is holding us back.

The first essay frames the rest with an unresolved dialectic: the battle between the Monitor and the Merrimack, the Union and Confederate ironclad warships that "fight forever, amen." They fired at each other point-blank, with each side's relative offensive strengths unable to overcome the other's defenses. After one of the Merrimack's shells exploded in front of the viewing slit of the Monitor's turret, the Monitor withdrew. Both were "happy to call it off" and both "declared victory." And though their physical forms fell away, "they're still fighting...[e]verywhere, actually." Their conflict continues in the ongoing struggle between new and old, North and South, factory and plantation, labor and land, supposed victor and supposed vanquished. This dark, dissonant poetry of U.S. history comes no clearer into focus than in the Civil War.

Americans might assume, as I did before studying, that the Confederacy was defeated and died the proper death of a traitor, with punishments including a minimum number of hangings for its worst and most dangerous leaders. But the Union was also infected by treasonous sympathizers of slavers and--maybe worse--half-measure centrists who never wanted to see the dispossession of owners of property, even when that property was in the form of humans. The effective Union policy was "not hanging any Southern officers" except one man who commanded a POW camp/death camp. Thus, the sabotage and reversal of Reconstruction: by 1875, "the same planter oligarchy was running the South again, terrorizing the Freedmen and women who were [the North's] only loyal allies during the war, making sure black people never got a chance to vote, running them off their farms, doing their best to recreate slavery without the name." The same Confederate officers who were spared the noose were leaders of the "terrorist fascist gangs" that kept Blacks from taking hold of the political and economic power they were due.

Brecher is refreshingly direct. He talks about the "practical killing" that would have been necessary to allow Reconstruction to succeed, as well as the traitors who should be spared not for justice but for tactics. Don't kill the figureheads, the incompetents, or the corrupt, but kill the "exceptional, the most ruthless, fearless, unkillable leaders." Hanging just two ex-Confederates, Nathan Bedford Forrest (later KKK frontman) and Wade Hampton (later creator of the fascist Red Shirts), might have steered American history in a different direction. Just a few hangings might have been enough to "interrupt[] the premature love-fest between (white) North and (white) South" that immediately followed the Civil War under supervision of President Andrew Johnson. Maybe it would have been hard to pick out Forrest and Hampton from the list of hang-ables, but they could have been hanged if the Union had done the right thing: "Hang every damn traitor who fit that bill"--all the "brutal, successful, young, civilian-origin leaders" of the Confederacy.

The Civil War killed the most Americans of any war in U.S. history, but it was not violent enough--in key moments and against key leaders, the North held back from necessary violence. And though many Northerners (Lincoln included) failed to see that necessity and wanted to preserve the Union "as it was"--with slavery in half the country--we shouldn't believe the too-common trope that they were simply a "product of their times" and that "no one thought otherwise" back then. The Civil War and the North's half-aborted victory were not "unavoidable tragedies" but were deliberate travesties that many people correctly saw as such. Those people lacked the blinders of material interests in maintaining the political economy of the antebellum United States. They included nearly forgotten congressman John Logan and a Polish Count named Adam Gurowski, the "most clear-headed of these prescient commentators" who "didn't love the slaves in a pitying, Bostonian way" but "considered them simply an oppressed peasantry." "Give them land, like any European peasantry, and they'll work it happily, gaining wealth slowly and cautiously." Gurowski furiously condemned the cowardice and treason of Union generals like McClellan, who consistently withheld decisive attacks on Confederate forces and retreated in the face of inferior forces.

McClellan was a traitor and a coward. Entrusted by Lincoln with the Union's largest army, McClellan did everything he could to avoid what should have been a victory over the Confederacy, acted in the interests of the Southern planter elite, and effectively prolonged the war by years and hundreds of thousands of lost lives. At the battle of Rich Mountain, he refused to advance according to plan and left a Union brigade to fight a Confederate force on a single front. The brigade that McClellan stranded still managed to defeat the Confederate force, but it was McClellan who took credit for the victory and thereby claimed command over the Army of the Potomac. The Peninsula Campaign of 1862 should have resulted in the sacking of Richmond and the hanging of Jefferson Davis, three years before Lee surrendered at Appomattox. McClellan had every advantage--over 100,000 soldiers and the unrivaled U.S. Navy, but he turned the campaign into a series of retreats which he commanded by telegraph from a safe distance of several kilometers. As he retreated farther into the protective umbrella of the navy, he wrote one of the most pathetic letters ever. Trembling in terror despite a personal bodyguard of 100,000+, he begged President Lincoln to preserve “property relations” (slavery), force New England to help recover escaped slaves, take it easy on the Confederates, and never consider emancipation. I can’t help but see in McClellan’s defense of slavery the root of his cowardice when facing the Confederate army. And yet, McClellan was full of himself and saw himself as a future dictator. Brecher concludes: “McClellan for one was very close to becoming Generalissimo and was only prevented from doing so by military failure and his own cowardice. You have to wonder, what would have happened if McClellan had managed to take or even just besiege Richmond?” It might have looked a lot like President Johnson’s planter-rehabilitation policies, but with a quicker end to the war.

The Confederacy’s unwillingness to interfere in (human) property relations also held back their success and resulted in more death among their own white ranks: 

Time after time, the diaries and letters of Confederate officers fume at the difficulty of getting slaveowners to lend their slaves to the Confederate military. Over and over, soldiers say bitterly that plantation owners willingly sent off their own sons to fight and die for the Confederacy, but would not lend their enslaved laborers unless forced to do so. “The sanctity of slave property in this war,” admitted Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon, “has operated most injuriously to the Confederacy…”

In short, “[r]acial hierarchy was just more fundamental to [Confederates] than the survival of the Confederacy.” Confederates held on to their slaves above all else, and refused to arm slaves who could have refilled the thin white ranks of the CSA. Their racial paranoia prevented them from tapping into their enormous reserve of shackled manpower. And though the Confederates lost, they managed to maintain the racial hierarchy so precious to them with the help of Northern centrists who would carry out a “sloppy, lazy postwar occupation” and “step back and allow the surviving Confederate elite to terrorize the freedmen into something resembling slavery without public auctions.”

If history is written by the victors, why has 160 years of Civil War history been so inflected with the Lost Cause narrative? Brecher makes a plausible suggestion: “though there isn’t much evidence for their [Lost Causers’] claims, they win out simply because their resentful adherents care more than the Union side, which lost interest in the South soon after winning the war. Resentment is a wonderful preservative.” To Brecher’s suggestion I would only add that the Lost Cause narrative has found tacit traction even among ostensible Northern Unionists because to thoroughly overturn the narrative would be to undermine the racial hierarchy that enables so much of the accumulation and exploitation that our capitalist system is built on. The Lost Cause not only makes them feel better; it undergirds their relative material privilege in society. Without that privilege, there would be little reason to maintain the narrative. Today, the Lost Cause’s adherents and ideological descendants tend to arise from a similar class. Sherman described them as “Sons of [Southern] planters, lawyers about towns, good billiard players and sportsmen, men who never did any work and never will. War suits them….” Brecher gives an updated description: “they’ve gained about 60 pounds per capita and forgotten how to ride a horse, but they’re still around, still sulking, and, thanks to the New York Times, they’ve been able to let the rest of us know it.”

There are many who believe or at least partially reproduce the Lost Cause narrative without identifying themselves as Lost Causers. This often comes out in the distorted retelling of Reconstruction and the giving of false reasons for its failure–e.g., that it was not “about race” and that its failure had nothing to do with racism. That’s the kind of Lost Cause garbage the New York Times publishes, which Brecher takes apart in chapter 16. As Brecher explains:

Reconstruction was a struggle about the role the freed slaves would play in the American polity. “Northern radicals” thought they should be treated like other American citizens. The defeated Confederates begged to disagree. Eventually…the ex-Confederates were allowed to disenfranchise the freed slaves, reinstitute a system that was very much “about race”--that was, in fact, a return to race-driven serfdom for the black people of the south, but without outright “African slavery.”

The failure of Reconstruction was that, as the Federal government became distracted and absorbed in other issues, the Planter elite made a deal with them on the lines of “Let us enserf the black people again and we’ll reenter the U.S.A. that we openly despised until you conquered us.” It was the dirtiest of deals, and recognized as such by many 19th-century commentators.

…

[T]hese sore losers, who were unfortunately allowed to reoccupy their estates and resume their vile pamphleteering tradition, immediately began “reinterpreting” the war, arguing that they hadn’t fought for slavery and that they hadn’t really lost at all.

…

[T]he very worst of the lot…started rewriting the history of the war and its aftermath, hoping to win the narrative of the war even after losing the war itself. 

The Lost Cause narrative and the voices of those who should have been hanged can be heard today without going too far out of the way. I’ve seen the Lost Cause plaque the Daughters of the Confederacy still have up at Fort Sumter, and I’ve driven past many times the Lost Cause park the Sons of Confederate Veterans maintains in southwest Washington. But I was still surprised to learn of one Lost Cause monument that still stands today, also courtesy of the Daughters of the Confederacy: the obelisk in Andersonville, Georgia, dedicated to Henry Wirz. Wirz was the only Confederate officer who the victors managed to hang. He was in charge of the POW death camp where 13,000 Union soldiers were tortured and intentionally starved to death. Even his hanging was too much for the Lost Causers and neo-Confederates, whose inscriptions on the obelisk cast Wirz as “the victim of a misdirected popular clamor,” unfairly stigmatized by “embittered prejudice.” Though I fully feel Brecher’s desire to smash the Wirz monument with a sledgehammer, I think the smashing might be premature. The monument is a shameful reminder that America’s past failures to carry victory and justice to their full conclusion have left the unpopular and embittered losers in power. Only once they’ve been hanged will we need no such reminders.

Comments

  1. Wirz is one of the figures in MacKinlay Cantor's book Andersonville. I knew nothing about the prison camp (or the Civil War) when I picked up the book a decade ago. Wirz is portrayed as some kind of misunderstood, tragic figure. I didn't understand why at the time.

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